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INTRODUCTION
In 1957, Justice Hugo Black, writing for the Supreme Court in
Conley v. Gibson, penned the famous words, that “[i]n appraising the
legal sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule
that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”1 For the next 50
years, this language both defined and embodied the standard for pleading
a complaint in the federal court system, under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 However, in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, the
Supreme Court, stating that Conley’s “no set of facts” language has been
“questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough,” concluded that
“this famous observation has earned its retirement.” 3
*

J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology. To Mom and Dad with love, everything that I am, I owe to you. Also,
special thanks to Professor Joan Steinman for her edits and commentary on the
rough drafts of my article. Her input was invaluable and deeply appreciated.
1
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (emphasis added).
2
Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that Conley’s “no set
of facts” language has been cited by federal courts over 10,000 times in different
contexts).
3
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1969 (2007).
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Writing for the Bell Atlantic majority, Justice Souter held that a
well-pleaded complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient “to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”4 Yet nowhere in
Rule 8(a)(2)5 is there any mention of “facts” or “factual allegations.”6
Rather, the drafters of Rule 8 were careful to avoid any reference to
“facts,” “evidence,” or “conclusions” in the Federal Rules, so as to
avoid the confusion that abounds under the Field Code of 1848.7 To
achieve this goal, the drafters intentionally substituted the phrase,
“claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”8 in place of the
code formulation, “facts constituting a cause of action.”9 The Conley
decision embraced this relaxed standard of pleadings, which sought to
keep litigants in the court system rather than force them out of it.10
Under Conley, outright dismissal of a claim was only permitted when
the judge had determined—after taking all the allegations in the
complaint as true—that proceeding to discovery or beyond would be
futile.11 The express disavowal of Conley’s “no set of facts” language
4

Id. at 1965.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
6
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
7
Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1975-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In 1848, David
Dudley Field created the New York Code, which required “[a] statement of facts
constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition,
and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what
is intended.” 1848 N. Y. Laws pp. 497, 521. The predecessor to modern notice
pleading, the New York Code of 1848, while more accessible by the common
litigant than the Hilary Rules of 1834, implemented a pleading spectrum that
confounded many commentators. The spectrum moved from evidentiary facts, to
ultimate facts, to conclusions of law, with the goal being to plead only the ultimate
facts. However, the distinctions between these three groupings were not abundantly
clear and often times were too subtle to provide any substantive guidance.
8
Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1976 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 5 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216
(3d ed. 2004)) (emphasis added).
9
Id. (emphasis added).
10
Id. at 1976-77.
11
Id. at 1977.
5
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by the Supreme Court indicates a heightening of federal pleading
standards, despite the Bell Atlantic majority’s unconvincing insistence
that they remain unchanged.12
In the wake of Bell Atlantic, the federal appellate courts have been
put to the task of interpreting the Supreme Court’s opinion and
applying this new standard of federal pleading to the cases before
them. Part I of this Note reviews the relevant background required to
discuss the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Bell Atlantic. This
background includes Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and
12(b)(6), the Supreme Court’s decision in Conley, and the Seventh
Circuit’s pre-Bell Atlantic Rule 12(b)(6) jurisprudence. Part II dissects
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell Atlantic and looks at the Supreme
Court’s subsequent decision in Erickson v. Pardus.13 Part III discusses
two Seventh Circuit cases—EEOC v. Concentra Health Services,
Inc.14 and Airborne Video & Beepers, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC15—
that interpret the Supreme Court decision in Bell Atlantic. Part IV
explores the way in which the district courts have applied Concentra
and Airborne. This Note concludes with a recapitulation of what is
required for a complaint to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss in the Seventh Circuit, as well as a brief discussion of the
impact that Concentra, Airborne and the other recent Seventh Circuit
decisions will have on practitioners in the Seventh Circuit.
I. BACKGROUND
Before discussing Bell Atlantic, it is necessary to understand
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 12(b)(6), as well as the
history of the Supreme Court’s Rule 8(a) jurisprudence.

12

Id. at 1973.
127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007).
14
496 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2007).
15
499 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 2007).
13
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A. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 lays out the general rules of
pleading in the federal court system.16 Subsection (a) of Rule 8
specifically describes what information a claim for relief (also referred
to in this Note as the complaint) must contain:
(a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief
must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the
court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction
and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include
relief in the alternative or different types of relief.17
Court’s interpret Rule 8(a)(2) when determining the standard of
pleading in the federal court system.18
A defendant can test the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s complaint by
making a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.”19 If the complaint has not satisfied the
requirements of Rule 8(a), this motion should be granted by the
court.20 The key question is what information Rule 8(a)(2) requires to
be stated in the complaint. Conley v. Gibson was one of the first cases
to provide an answer to this question.

16

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
Id.
18
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Bell Atlantic 127 S. Ct. at
1964-1965.
19
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
20
Id.
17
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B. Conley v. Gibson
In Conley, plaintiffs brought a class action suit under the Railway
Labor Act alleging discrimination against them by their bargaining
agents.21 The complaint alleged that the petitioners were employees of
the Texas and New Orleans Railroad; that Local 28 of the Brotherhood
was the designated bargaining agent for the petitioners under the
Railway Labor Act; and that a contract existed between the Union and
the Railroad which provided the employees in the bargaining unit
certain protections against discharge and loss of seniority. It further
alleged that in May of 1954, the Railroad purported to abolish 45 jobs
held by the petitioners or other black railroad workers and that all of
the petitioners were either discharged or demoted. The complaint
further stated that the 45 jobs were not actually abolished, but instead
filled by whites as the blacks were forced to leave; that despite pleas
from the petitioners, the Union did nothing to protect them from the
racially discriminatory discharges; and that the Union refused to give
them protection comparable to that afforded to white employees.
Ultimately, the petitioners alleged that the Union was acting according
to a plan and that under the Railway Labor Act such discrimination
violated petitioners’ rights to fair representation from their bargaining
agent.22 Petitioners asked for a declaratory judgment, an injunction
and damages.23
The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on several
grounds including that the complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be given.24 The district court dismissed the case due
to lack of jurisdiction, finding that the National Railroad Adjustment
Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy, and the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.25 The Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari and held that the dismissal for lack of
21

Conley, 355 U.S. at 42.
Id. at 43
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
22
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jurisdiction was error.26 The Supreme Court also decided the
respondents’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, even though it had not been
decided below because of the lower court’s ruling on the jurisdictional
issue.27 The Court found it proper to rule on the respondent’s motion
because both parties had already briefed the issue and the respondents
urged the Court to uphold the decision below on grounds other than
lack of jurisdiction if necessary.28
Justice Black first set forth the above-quoted and oft-cited rule
that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”29 In
adjudicating the sufficiency of the petitioners’ complaint, the Court
looked to the general principle that the Railway Labor Act prohibits
discrimination in representation on the basis of race.30 Because the
petitioners alleged in their complaint that the Union denied them
protection on the basis of their race, the allegations, if proven, would
demonstrate that the Union breached its statutory duty to fairly
represent all of the employees of the bargaining unit.31 As such,
petitioner’s complaint sufficiently stated a claim upon which relief
could be granted.32
The respondents argued that dismissal was proper because the
petitioners’ complaint failed to set forth specific facts in support of its
general allegations of discrimination.33 However, the Court stated
emphatically that:

26

Id. at 44
Id. at 45
28
Id.
29
Id. at 45-46
30
Id. at 46; see Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768
(1952); Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232
(1949); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
31
Conley, 355 U.S. at 46.
32
Id. at 48.
33
Id. at 47.
27
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[T]he Federal rules of Civil Procedure do not require a
claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his
claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is ‘a short plain
statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair
notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.34
According to Justice Black, this loose standard of pleading—
referred to as “notice pleading”—was made possible by the
opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures authorized
by the Federal Rules.35 These devices, and not the pleadings, are
aimed at more precisely establishing the basis of the plaintiff’s
claims.36
In dozens of cases over the next half century, the Supreme Court
and the federal courts of appeals followed Justice Black’s reasoning
from Conley and cited his “no set of facts” language as the standard
for notice pleading required by Rule 8(a)(2).37 Although court’s38 and
34

Id.
Id. at 47-48
36
Id.
37
In Justice Stevens’ dissent in Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1978, he provides
the following string citation to illustrate his point that Conley’s “no set of facts”
language has indeed been the federal pleading standard since the Court’s decision in
Conley in 1957:
SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 818, 122 S. Ct. 1899, 153 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002);
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629, 654, 119 S. Ct. 1661, 143 L. Ed.
2d 839 (1999); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 811, 113 S. Ct.
2891, 125 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1993); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598, 109
S. Ct. 1378, 103 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1989); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10, 101 S. Ct.
173, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1980) (per curiam); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New
Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 246, 100 S. Ct. 502, 62 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1980); Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976); Hospital Building
Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 746, 96 S. Ct. 1848, 48 L. Ed. 2d 338
(1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90
(1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 31 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1972)
(per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652
(1972) (per curiam); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 422, 89 S. Ct. 1843, 23 L.
Ed. 2d 404 (1969) (plurality opinion); see also Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill,
35
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470 U.S. 532, 554, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 587, 104 S. Ct.
1989, 80 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 561, n. 1, 97 S. Ct. 1885, 52 L. Ed. 2d 571 (1977) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 55,
n. 6, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
See, e.g., EB Invs., LLC v. Atlantis Development, Inc., 930 So. 2d 502, 507 (Ala.
2005); Department of Health & Social Servs. v. Native Village of Curyung, 151 P.
3d 388, 396 (Alaska 2006); Newman v. Maricopa Cty., 167 Ariz. 501, 503, 808 P.2d
1253, 1255 (App. 1991); Public Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk, 27 P. 3d 377, 385386 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); Clawson v. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, LLC, 906 A.2d
308, 312 (D. C. 2006); Hillman Constr. Corp. v. Wainer, 636 So. 2d 576, 578 (Fla.
App. 1994); Kaplan v. Kaplan, 266 Ga. 612, 613, 469 S. E. 2d 198, 199 (1996);
Wright v. Home Depot U.S.A., 111 Haw. 401, 406, 142 P. 3d 265, 270 (2006);
Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 257, 127 P. 3d 156, 160 (2005); Fink v. Bryant,
2001-CC-0987, p. 4 (La. 11/28/01), 801 So. 2d 346, 349; Gagne v. Cianbro Corp.,
431 A.2d 1313, 1318-1319 (Me. 1981); Gasior v. Massachusetts Gen. Hospital, 446
Mass. 645, 647, 846 N.E.2d 1133, 1135 (2006); Ralph Walker, Inc. v. Gallagher,
926 So. 2d 890, 893 (Miss. 2006); Jones v. Montana Univ. System, 337 Mont. 1, 7,
155 P. 3d 1247, ____ (2007); Johnston v. Neb. Dep't of Corr. Servs., 270 Neb. 987,
989, 709 N.W.2d 321, 324 (2006); Blackjack Bonding v. Las Vegas Munic. Ct., 116
Nev. 1213, 1217, 14 P. 3d 1275, 1278 (2000); Shepard v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 361 N.
C. 137, 139, 638 S. E. 2d 197, 199 (2006); Rose v. United Equitable Ins. Co., 2001
ND 154, P10, 632 N.W.2d 429, 434; State ex rel. Turner v. Houk, 112 Ohio St. 3d
561, 562, 2007-Ohio-814, P5, 862 N.E.2d 104, 105 (per curiam); Moneypenney v.
Dawson, 2006 OK 53, P2, 141 P. 3d 549, 551; Gagnon v. State, 570 A.2d 656, 659
(R. I. 1990); Osloond v. Farrier, 2003 SD 28, P4, 659 N.W.2d 20, 22 (per curiam);
Smith v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc., 712 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tenn. 1986); Association
of Haystack Property Owners v. Sprague, 145 Vt. 443, 446, 494 A.2d 122, 124
(1985); In re Coday, 156 Wn. 2d 485, 497, 130 P. 3d 809, 815 (2006) (en banc);
Haines v. Hampshire Cty. Comm'n, 216 W. Va. 499, 502, 607 S. E. 2d 828, 831
(2004); Warren v. Hart, 747 P.2d 511, 512 (Wyo. 1987); see also Malpiede v.
Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1082-1083 (Del. 2001) (permitting dismissal only "where
the court determines with reasonable certainty that the plaintiff could prevail on no
set of facts that may be inferred from the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Canel v. Topinka, 212 Ill. 2d 311, 318, 818
N.E.2d 311, 317, 288 Ill. Dec. 623 (2004) (replacing "appears beyond doubt" in the
Conley formulation with "is clearly apparent"); In re Young, 522 N.E.2d 386, 388
(Ind. 1988) (per curiam) (replacing "appears beyond doubt" with "appears to a
certainty"); Barkema v. Williams Pipeline Co., 666 N.W.2d 612, 614 (Iowa 2003)
(holding that a motion to dismiss should be sustained "only when there exists no
conceivable set of facts entitling the non-moving party to relief"); Pioneer Village v.
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scholars39 frequently questioned this standard over that period of time,
the viability of Conley remained intact until Bell Atlantic v. Twombly.40
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Pre-Bell Atlantic Rule 12(b)(6)
Jurisprudence
In Doe v. Smith,41 the plaintiff, a 16-year-old girl, engaged in
consensual sexual relations with the defendant.42 Unbeknownst to
plaintiff, the defendant used a hidden camera to make a recording of
the two in bed together.43 Plaintiff alleged that after their relationship
ended the defendant circulated copies of the videotape via email, and

Bullitt Cty., 104 S. W. 3d 757, 759 (Ky. 2003) (holding that judgment on the
pleadings should be granted "if it appears beyond doubt that the nonmoving party
cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle him/her to relief"); Corley v. Detroit
Bd. of Ed., 470 Mich. 274, 277, 681 N.W.2d 342, 345 (2004) (per curiam) (holding
that a motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted only "'if no factual
development could possibly justify recovery'"); Oberkramer v. Ellisville, 706
S.W.2d 440, 441 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (omitting the words "beyond doubt" from the
Conley formulation); Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah
1990) (holding that a motion to dismiss is appropriate "only if it clearly appears that
[the plaintiff] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim"); NRC Mgmt. Servs.
Corp. v. First Va. Bank - Southwest, 63 Va. Cir. 68, 70 (2003) ("The Virginia
standard is identical [to the Conley formulation], though the Supreme Court of
Virginia may not have used the same words to describe it").
38
Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1969 (citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d
1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989); O’Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 n.3 (1st Cir.
1976); McGregor v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., 856 F.2d 39, 42-43 (6th Cir.
1988)).
39
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV.
1665, 1685 (1998); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 463-465 (1986), (cited in
Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1969).
40
127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
41
429 F.3d 706, 707 (7th Cir. 2005).
42
Id.
43
Id.
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that at least one of the recipients posted the recording on the internet.44
Plaintiff filed suit under the federal wire-tapping statute,45 alleging that
the video recording was an unauthorized interception, and that its
disclosure was forbidden.46 The district court dismissed under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.47
It ruled that plaintiff’s complaint was deficient because it failed to
allege that the recording was an “interception” within the meaning of
§2510(4).48 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded.49
Writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook agreed that the complaint
did not allege that the defendant “intercepted” anything.50 However, he
wrote:
[P]leadings in federal court need not allege facts
corresponding to each “element” of a statute . . . . Usually
they need do no more than narrate a grievance simply and
directly, so that the defendant knows what he has been
accused of . . . . Complaints initiate the litigation but need
not cover everything necessary for the plaintiff to win;
factual details and legal arguments come later. A complaint
suffices if any facts consistent with its allegations, and
showing entitlement to prevail, could be established by
affidavit or testimony at trial.51
He determined that the plaintiff’s complaint satisfied this standard
because “it is easy to tell what [the defendant] is complaining about.”52
44

Id.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
46
Smith, 429 F.3d at 707.
47
Id. at 708.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 710.
50
Id. at 708.
51
Id.
52
Id.
45
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Judge Easterbrook cautioned that district court judges tempted to
dismiss a complaint because it does not contain a specific allegation
should recall that only those claims explicitly stated in Rule 9(b) are
required to be pleaded with particularity.53 Because “interception” is
not on Rule 9(b)’s short list, it was error by the district court to
dismiss.54
In Kolupa v. Roselle Park District,55 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals followed the reasoning of the Smith court. Plaintiff,
Christopher Kolupa, alleged that the defendant violated Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 196456 by firing him on account of his religious
beliefs.57 The district judge dismissed the complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted.58 On appeal, Judge
Easterbrook affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case
for proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion.59
Judge Easterbrook began by explaining the applicable federal
pleading standard.60 He wrote that, “Federal complaints plead claims
rather than facts . . . It is enough to name the plaintiff and the
defendant, state the nature of the grievance, and give a few tidbits
(such as the date) that will let the defendant investigate. A full
narrative is unnecessary.”61 In order to state a claim for religious
discrimination, a plaintiff is only required to “recite that the employer
has caused some concrete injury by holding the worker’s religion
against him.”62

53

Id.
Id.
55
438 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2006) overruled by EEOC v. Concentra Health
Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2007).
56
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
57
Kolupa, 438 F.3d at 714.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 716.
60
Id. at 714.
61
Id.
62
Id.
54
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The district judge dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint because it
failed to allege that the other employees were similarly situated with
respect to him, or that the other employees were outside of the
protected class.63 According to Judge Easterbrook, however, it was
error on the part of the district court to require the plaintiff to plead
facts that pertain to every aspect of a prima facie case for a Title VII
violation.64 Citing the Smith decision, Judge Easterbrook reiterated
“that complaints need not plead facts and need not narrate events that
correspond to each aspect of the applicable legal rule. Any decision
declaring ‘this complaint is deficient because it does not allege X’ is a
candidate for summary reversal, unless X is on the list of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 9(b).”65 He reversed the lower court’s decision with respect to the
discriminatory discharge claim.66
Plaintiff’s complaint also alleged that the Park District failed to
accommodate his religious beliefs, failed to promote him, and
retaliated against him when he tried to protect his rights.67 Judge
Easterbrook affirmed the dismissal of these claims because there was
no mention made of them in the plaintiff’s administrative charge.68
II. THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
In Bell Atlantic, plaintiffs William Twombly and Lawrence
Marcus brought a class action suit on behalf of the subscribers of local
telephone and/or high speed internet services against the incumbent
local exchange carriers (“ILECs”) that comprise Bell Atlantic
63

Id.
Id.
65
Id. at 715; Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) says: “In alleging fraud or
mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be
alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
66
Kolupa, 438 F.3d at 716.
67
Id. at 715.
68
Id. at 716.
64
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Corporation.69 The complaint alleged violations of Section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, which proscribes “every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or foreign nations.”70 The
complaint alleged that the Bell Atlantic ILECs conspired to restrain
trade (1) by engaging in parallel conduct in their respective service
areas to inhibit the growth of competitive local exchange carriers
(“CLECs”) and (2) by agreeing to refrain from competing against one
another, as evidenced by their common failure to pursue attractive
business opportunities in contiguous markets, and by a statement of
one ILEC’s CEO that competing in another ILEC’s territory did not
seem right.71
The district court dismissed the complaint because it found that
the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.72 It reasoned that mere allegations of parallel business
conduct do not state a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and
that the plaintiffs are required to allege additional facts tending to
exclude independent self-interested conduct as an explanation for the
parallel action of the ILECs.73 On appeal, the Second Circuit, citing
Conley, reversed the trial court’s ruling and held that plaintiffs’
complaint was sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because
the ILECs failed to show that there is “no set of facts” that would
permit the plaintiffs to demonstrate that the parallel conduct they
alleged was the product of collusion rather than coincidence.74
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the
proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through
allegations of parallel conduct.75 In reversing the Second Circuit and
reinstating the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint, the
69

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1962 (2007).
Id.
71
Id.
72
Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 313 F.Supp.2d 174, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
73
Id.
74
Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 119 (2d Cir. 2005).
75
Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1963.
70
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Court held that even though a complaint need not contain detailed
factual allegations, “a plaintiff’s obligation to demonstrate the
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.”76 “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level,” and absent at least some
factual allegations in the complaint, “it is hard to see how a claimant
could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the
nature of the claims, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”77
The Court’s rationale for requiring such factual allegations in the
complaint was rooted in the rising costs of litigation and of
compliance with discovery, in particular.78 According to the Court, a
complaint that contains no factual allegations does not give rise to a
“reasonable expectation” that discovery will reveal any evidence of
the conduct complained of and “‘this basic deficiency should . . . be
exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by
the parties and the court.’”79 The Court mentioned that the expense of
antitrust discovery, the use of discovery by plaintiffs to extract
nuisance value from suits, and the increasing caseload of the federal
court system all weighed in favor of requiring a plaintiff to
demonstrate the plausibility of his claims at the pleading stage.80
Plaintiffs’ main argument against the “plausibility standard”81 was
based on Justice Black’s “no set of facts” language from the Court’s
decision in Conley.82 However, the Court says that Conley’s “no set of
facts” language never was intended to be read literally or in isolation,
and that such a narrow reading of those words led to the erroneous
conclusion that “a wholly conclusory statement of claim would
survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the
76

Id. at 1964-1965.
Id. at 1965.
78
Id. at 1965-1966.
79
Id. at 1966.
80
Id. at 1966-1967.
81
Id. at 1968.
82
Id.
77
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possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some ‘set of
undisclosed facts’ to support recovery.” 83 Rather, the Court stated that
Conley stands for the proposition that “once a claim has been stated
adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent
with the allegations in the complaint.”84 In dismissing the complaint,
the Court reasserted that it was not applying a heightened pleading
standard in the context of antitrust litigation, but instead was clarifying
and enunciating an often misunderstood legal principle. 85
According to the Bell Atlantic dissent, however, there is not, nor
has there ever been, any confusion about the standard of notice
pleading that has dominated the federal system for the last 50 years.86
Justice Stevens—the author of the dissent— believes that two practical
concerns are at the heart of the Court’s departure from “settled
procedural law.”87 Namely, the extraordinary expense that antitrust
litigation can impose on a defendant, and the risk that jurors may
believe that evidence of parallel conduct is sufficient to find an
agreement as opposed to similar decisions made while defendants act
independently of one another.88
In response to these legitimate concerns, Justice Stevens argued
that careful case management, strict controls over the discovery
process, close examination of the evidence at the summary judgment
stage, and carefully crafted jury instructions offer a satisfactory
solution.89 He did not believe that the Majority’s concerns provided a
sufficient reason to dismiss an adequately pleaded complaint and to
allow the defendants to avoid filing an answer in which they could
deny, or perhaps admit, that they acted, or omitted to act, in concert.90

83

Id. at 1968-1969.
Id. at 1969.
85
Id. at 1973.
86
Id. at 1978 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87
Id. at 1975
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
84
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The dissent went on to describe the history of pleading rules
throughout the Anglo-American experience, noting the stringency with
which such rules were applied in the early 19th century and the
relaxation of these standards as time passed.91 According to Justice
Stevens, the goal of the relaxed pleading requirements of the Federal
Rules “was not to keep litigants out of court but rather to keep them
in,” and Conley’s “no set of facts” language is consistent with that
goal. Its “formulation permits outright dismissal only when proceeding
to discovery or beyond would be futile.”92
In further support of the dissenters’ belief that Rule 8(a)(2) does
not require a plaintiff to plead any specific facts in the complaint, the
dissent pointed to Rule 9’s imposition of a “particularity” requirement
on all complaints that allege fraud or mistake.93 Given the canon of
statutory construction expressio unius est exclusion alterius— “the
expression of one is the exclusion of others”—it argued that Congress
clearly did not intend plaintiffs who are not alleging fraud or mistake
to have to plead with the kind of factual specificity required by the
majority.94
B. Erickson v. Pardus
Just two weeks after Bell Atlantic, the Supreme Court handed
down another opinion regarding Rules 8(a)(2), 12(b)(6) and the federal
pleading standard.95 In Erickson, a prison inmate filed suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights by prison officials at the Limon Correctional Facility in
Colorado.96 The petitioner, William Erickson, alleged that a liver
condition that resulted from hepatitis C required a medical treatment
91

Id. at 1975-1976
Id. at 1977
93
Id. at 1977 n.4
94
Id.
95
The decision in Bell Atlantic was handed down on May 21, 2007. The Court
decided Erickson on June 4.
96
Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2197-98 (2007).
92
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program that the officials had commenced but wrongfully terminated,
consequently putting his life in danger.97 The district court dismissed
petitioner’s complaint for failure to state a claim, and the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, characterizing the complaint’s
allegations as “conclusory.”98 The Supreme Court vacated the
judgment from below and remanded the case for further review.99
According to petitioner’s complaint, officials at the Colorado
Department of Corrections (“Department”) diagnosed the petitioner
with hepatitis C.100 Petitioner began treatment for the disease after
completing the necessary courses and complying with Department
procedures.101 The year-long treatment program required the use of a
syringe for weekly self-injections of medication.102 However, after
petitioner’s treatment began prison officials were unable to account for
one of the syringes made available to him and the other prisoners
receiving similar medical attention.103 Eventually, they found it in a
communal trash can, modified in a manner which suggested illegal
drug use.104
The prison officials, disbelieving petitioner’s claim that he had not
taken the syringe, cited him for violating the Colorado penal code’s
provisions against possession of drug paraphernalia.105 Furthermore,
petitioner was removed from his treatment program as a result of the
officials’ assessment that he intended to use drugs.106 Petitioner
alleged that “Dr. Bloor had ‘removed [him] from [his] hepatitis C
treatment’ in violation of department protocol, ‘thus endangering [his]

97

Id. at 2197-98.
Id. at 2198.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
98
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life.’”107 He requested relief including damages and an injunction
requiring the Department to resume his treatment for hepatitis C.108
Three months after filing his complaint, petitioner filed a Motion
for expedited Review Due to Imminent Danger indicating it was
undisputed that he had hepatitis C, that he met the Department’s
standards for treatment of the disease, and that his liver was suffering
irreversible harm due to lack of treatment.109 Respondents filed a
motion to dismiss, and the Magistrate Judge before whom the motion
was pending recommended that the District Court dismiss the
complaint because petitioner failed to allege that Dr. Bloor’s actions
caused him “substantial harm.”110 The District Court agreed with the
Magistrate Judge and dismissed the complaint.111 The Court of
Appeals affirmed, stating that petitioner had failed to “allege that as a
result of the discontinuance of the treatment itself shortly after it began
or the interruption of treatment for approximately eighteen months he
suffered any harm, let alone substantial harm, [other] than what he
already faced from Hepatitis C itself[.]”112
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a Per Curiam
opinion, reversed the decision from below, holding that “[i]t was error
for the Court of Appeals to conclude that petitioner’s allegations were
too conclusory to establish for pleading purposes that petitioner had
suffered ‘a cognizable independent harm’ as a result of his removal
from the hepatitis C treatment program.”113 Quoting Justice Stevens’
opinion from Bell Atlantic, the Court stated that “Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ Specific facts are

107

Id. at 2199 (quoting Petitioner’s Complaint) (brackets in original).
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id. (quoting the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation on Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss).
111
Id.
112
Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 198 Fed. Appx. 694, 697 (10th Cir. 2006)).
113
Id. at 2200 (quoting Erickson, 198 Fed. Appx. At 698).
108
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not necessary; the statement need only “’give the defendant fair notice
of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”114
Petitioner’s complaint stated that Dr. Bloor’s decision to remove
him from his hepatitis C treatment constituted a danger to his life.115 It
alleged that his medication was discontinued shortly after the
treatment program began; that the prescribed treatment program was
supposed to last a year; that he was still in need of treatment for his
condition; and that prison officials refused to provide him with
treatment.116 According to the Court, “[t]his alone was enough to
satisfy Rule 8(a)(2).” In addition, petitioner strengthened his claim by
making more specific allegations in documents attached to the
complaint and in later filings.117
The Court also pointed out that petitioner was proceeding pro se,
and that documents filed pro se are “to be liberally construed.”118 This
fact made the Court of Appeals’ departure from Rule 8(a)(2)’s liberal
pleading standards even more evident, because “a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”119
The Court did not determine whether petitioner’s complaint was
sufficient in all respects, because respondents’ raised multiple
arguments in their motion to dismiss that were not decided by the
district court.120 The Court did decide, however, that the complaint
could not be dismissed on the ground that the allegations in the
complaint were too conclusory.121 The Court vacated the judgment of
the Court of Appeals, and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with the Court’s opinion.
114

Id. at 2200 (quoting Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1964 (quoting Conley, 355
U.S. at 47)).
115
Id. at 2200.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
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III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CASES INTERPRETING BELL ATLANTIC V.
TWOMBLY
Although the Seventh Circuit had already cited Bell Atlantic in
three separate decisions, it did not seriously dissect the Supreme
Court’s opinion in that case until EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs.,
Inc. 122 In Concentra, the Seventh Circuit determined that the federal
pleading standard laid out in Bell Atlantic requires a complaint not
only to provide the defendant with fair notice of the claims against him
and the grounds upon which they rest, but to also plausibly suggest
that the pleader is entitled to relief.123 However, Bell Atlantic left
largely unanswered what it means to “plausibly suggest that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”
Although the Supreme Court attempted to explain the newly
imposed plausibility standard with declarations such as, “the ‘plain
statement’ [must] possess enough heft to ‘show that the pleader is
entitled to relief,’”124 and “[f]actual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above a speculative level,”125 such statements do
not provide any substantive guidance as to how much, or what type of
factual detail is ultimately required under the “plausibility standard.”
The Seventh Circuit maintained in Airborne Video & Beepers, Inc. v.
AT & T Mobility LLC that specific facts need not be pled in the
complaint. 126 As a practical matter, however, it does not appear
possible to satisfy either Bell Atlantic, or the Seventh Circuit’s

122

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued opinions in three cases that
cited to or quoted Bell Atlantic before EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496
F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2007). None of them, however, delved into the Supreme Court’s
decision as deeply as the court in Concentra did. See In re Ocwen Loan Servicing,
491 F.3d 638, 646 (7th Cir. 2007); Jennings v. Auto Meter Products, 495 F.3d 466,
472 (7th Cir. 2007); Local 15, IBEW v. Exelon Corp., 495 F.3d 779, 782 (7th Cir.
2007).
123
Concentra, 496 F.3d at 776.
124
Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1966 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
125
Id. at 1965.
126
Airborne, 499 F.3d at 667.
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interpretation of Bell Atlantic, without including some factual
allegations in the complaint.
A. EEOC v. Concentra Health Services
In EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., plaintiff Charles Horn
filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) when he was fired by his employer Concentra
Health Services (“Concentra”).127 The EEOC brought suit against
Concentra on behalf of Horn alleging retaliation, in violation of 42
U.S.C. §20003-3(a).128 According to the complaint, Horn reported to
Concentra’s director of human resources that “his female supervisor
gave a male subordinate, with whom she was having an inappropriate
sexual relationship, preferential treatment over similarly situated
employees with respect to his employment,” and that Concentra
responded by firing Horn.129
The district court granted Concentra’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion and
dismissed the EEOC’s complaint.130 It held that Horn could not have
believed that the activities he opposed violated Title VII because, at
the time Horn reported the affair, favoring a subordinate because of a
sexual relationship did not, without more, constitute a violation of
Title VII.131 The court further held that even had Horn actually
believed that the affair was a violation of Title VII, his belief was not
reasonable, and thus the EEOC’s complaint did not state a claim.132
The EEOC filed an amended complaint which, in the opinion of
the district court, differed from the original only in that the paragraph
setting forth the EEOC’s claim was far less detailed.133 It read as
follows:
127

Concentra, 496 F.3d at 775
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 775-776.
133
Id. at 776.
128
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Since at least 2001, Defendant has engaged in unlawful
employment practices at its Elk Grove location in violation
of Section 704(a) of title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Such
unlawful employment practices include, but are not limited
to, retaliating against Horn after he opposed conduct in the
workplace that he objectively and reasonably believed in
good faith violated Title VII by reporting the conduct to
Concentra’s Director of Human Resources. Concentra’s
retaliation includes, but is not limited to, issuing Horn
unwarranted negative evaluations and terminating him.134
Concentra again moved to dismiss and the district court again
granted the motion, this time with prejudice.135 The court based its
decision on its opinion that the complaint did not provide sufficient
notice of the nature of the EEOC’s claim and that the complaint failed
to specify the conduct that Horn believed to be in violation of Title
VII.136 The EEOC subsequently appealed.137
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal on
appeal. Writing for the majority, Judge Cudahy engaged in a
discussion about the standard of pleading required in the federal court
system in the aftermath of Bell Atlantic. 138 He began by stating that
the Supreme Court has interpreted the language of Rule 8(a)(2) as
“impos[ing] two easy-to-clear hurdles” on the pleader:139
First, the complaint must describe the claim in sufficient
detail to give the defendant “fair notice of what the claim is

134

Id.
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
135
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and the grounds upon which it rests.”140 Second, its
allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a
right to relief, raising that possibility above a “speculative
level”; if they do not, the plaintiff pleads itself out of
court.141
Concentra argued that the EEOC failed to meet either of the Bell
Atlantic requirements.142
Somewhat confusingly, Judge Cudahy began his ‘plausibility’
analysis by focusing on the EEOC’s initial complaint rather than the
amended complaint.143 Careful consideration of the arguments
advanced on appeal by Concentra, as well as consideration of an
argument that Concentra chose not to advance in support of dismissal
are necessary to understand the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning on the
plausibility issue.
Concentra’s first argument for affirming the lower court’s
dismissal was that the EEOC “pleaded itself out of court by alleging
that Horn reported his supervisor’s favoritism to a lover,” an argument
that, according to Judge Cudahy, “reflects a fond nostalgia for the
EEOC’s original complaint.”144 Judge Cudahy acknowledged that
dismissal of the initial complaint was probably correct; however, he
did note that the now “rejected ‘favoring a paramour’ theory [] did not
logically foreclose the possibility that some other aspect of Horn’s
report might have furnished a ground for relief.”145 In so doing, he
pointed out that some of the Seventh Circuit’s past cases suggested
that the EEOC’s initial complaint would have been able to withstand a

140

Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964
(2007)(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957))(emphasis added).
141
Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964
(2007)(emphasis added).
142
Id. at 776-777.
143
Id. at 777.
144
Id. at 777.
145
Id. (emphasis added).
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Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.146 Yet those cases all were based on
Conley’s disavowed “no set of facts” language and no longer dictated
the Seventh Circuit’s jurisprudence with regard to the sufficiency of a
complaint.147 Now, a complaint “must actually suggest that the
plaintiff has a right to relief by providing allegations that ‘raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.’”148 “[I]t is not enough for a
complaint to avoid foreclosing possible bases for relief[.]”149
The court also discussed the fact that Concentra did not argue that
the allegations in the EEOC’s amended complaint “fail[ed] to
plausibly suggest a right to relief.”150 Rather, Concentra attempted to
rely on a “narrow exception” to Federal Rule 10(c) that would have
incorporated Horn’s original charge to the EEOC into the amended
complaint, thus condemning the amended complaint to the same fate
as the original.151 Why take this back door approach to having the
complaint dismissed, as opposed to attacking its face? According to
Judge Cudahy:
Bell Atlantic itself does not appear to suggest that the bare
idea of an antitrust conspiracy among major telephone
companies like the one alleged in that case is implausible;
rather, it appears to hold that the plaintiffs pleaded
themselves out of court with detailed “allegations of parallel
conduct” that did not plausibly suggest such a conspiracy.152
Similarly, it was Horn’s detailed allegations of the conduct giving
rise to the Title VII violation that resulted in the dismissal of the

146

Id.
Id.
148
Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965
(2007))(emphasis in original).
149
Id. (emphasis in original).
150
Id.
151
Id. at 778.
152
Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1963, 1966) (emphasis in original).
147
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original complaint.153 The leaner allegations of the amended
complaint, that Concentra retaliated against Horn for making a report
protected by Title VII—although possibly deficient in providing the
defendant with the notice required by Rule 8—is no less plausible than
a prison doctor improperly withholding medication from a prisoner.154
The court found that the EEOC did not plead itself out of court with its
amended complaint and it moved on to the question of notice.155
On the notice issue, Concentra argued that dismissal was proper
because the complaint did not specify the conduct that the plaintiff
reported to Concentra’s Human Resources Director.156 Here the court
agreed.157 Judge Cudahy reasoned that Rule 8(a)(2) requires that there
be some minimum level of factual detail in the complaint that is
sufficient to “give the defendant fair notice of what . . . the claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.”158 The question for the court to
resolve in close cases is how much factual detail is required before the
defendant has been given fair notice.159
Judge Cudahy explained that, although the Rules do not require
highly detailed factual pleadings, they do not “promote vagueness or
reward deliberate obfuscation” either.160 Rather:
Encouraging a plaintiff to plead what few facts can be easily
provided and will clearly be helpful serves to expedite
resolution by quickly alerting the defendant to the basic,
critical factual allegations (that is, by providing “fair notice”
of the plaintiff’s claim) and, if appropriate, permitting a
quick test of the legal sufficiency of those allegations.161
153

Id. at 775-776.
Id. at 778 (referencing Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2200).
155
Id. at 778-779.
156
Id. at 779.
157
Id. at 782.
158
Id. at 779.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 780.
161
Id.
154
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Simply put, a complaint should contain clearly important
information that a plaintiff is easily able to provide.162 The Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and Judge Cudahy
denied the EEOC’s request for leave to file a second amended
complaint in order to conform to Bell Atlantic, expressing doubt that
Bell Atlantic changed the applicable federal pleading standard.163
B. Airborne Video & Beepers, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC
The Seventh Circuit refined its Rule 8 analysis in a case decided
three weeks after Concentra. In Airborne Video & Beepers, Inc. v. AT
& T Mobility LLC, 164 the Seventh Circuit tried to read the Supreme
Court’s Bell Atlantic decision in harmony with Erickson v. Pardus.165
In Airborne, an owner of a retail store specializing in cellular, pager
and long-distance telephone services brought suit against a telephone
company for, among other things, breach of contract, tortious
interference with business relationships, and deceptive and fraudulent
practices when the telephone company stopped paying the plaintiff
commissions on service activations. 166 Due to the plaintiff’s repeated
inability to properly file an adequate complaint, the district court
denied plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a fourth amended
complaint.167
On appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
ruling.168 In so doing Judge Wood further explored the Seventh
Circuit’s pleading standards even though she acknowledged that this
issue was not raised on appeal.169 In her opinion, Judge Wood recited
Bell Atlantic’s language that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
162

Id.
Id. at 782.
164
499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007).
165
Id. (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007)).
166
Id. at 664.
167
Id. at 666.
168
Id. at 668.
169
Id. at 667-668.
163

516
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss2/3

26

Saltzman: Ding, Dong, Conley ’s Dead: Bell Atlantic Changes the Federal Ple

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 2

Spring 2008

‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions.”170 Yet, she found that the Erickson decision clearly
indicated that Bell Atlantic did not represent a shift to fact-pleading in
the federal system.171 According to Judge Wood, Erickson reaffirmed
that Rule 8 does not require specific facts, but merely requires that the
defendant be given “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.”172 Taking these two propositions
together, Judge Wood wrote:
[W]e understand the [Supreme] Court to be saying only that
at some point the factual detail in a complaint may be so
sketchy that the complaint does not provide the type of
notice of the claim to which the defendant is entitled under
Rule 8.173
As such, a plaintiff can present as little factual detail in the
complaint as he wants, provided the complaint plausibly raises his
right to relief above a speculative level, as well as puts the defendant
on notice of the claims against him and the grounds upon which they
rest.174
170

Id. at 667.
Id.; Contrary to the federal pleading standards, Illinois is a fact pleading
jurisdiction. In a fact-pleading jurisdiction, rather than merely provide the defendant
with fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests, Bell
Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1964, a plaintiff “must allege facts sufficient to bring a claim
within a legally recognized cause of action.” Vernon v. Schuster, 179 Ill. 2d 338, 344
(1997); see Weiss v. Waterhouse Secs., Inc., 208 Ill. 2d 439, 451 (Ill. 2004) (stating
that “Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction”).
172
Airborne, 499 F.3d at 667.
173
Id.
174
Concentra, 496 F.3d 773; Airborne, 499 F.3d 663; Killingsworth v. HSBC
Bank Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 2007); See, e.g., Johnson v. Lappin,
No. 07-1465, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 3393 at *4 (7th Cir.Feb. 13, 2008); Vancrete v.
Appelman, No. 07-3214, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 2837 at *7 (7th Cir. Jan. 18, 2008);
Lang v. TCF National Bank, 249 Fed. Appx. 464, 466 (7th Cir. 2007); Sellers v.
Daniels, 242 Fed. Appx. 363, 364 (7th Cir. 2007); Estate of Sims v. County of
Bureau, 506 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 2007); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 608 (7th
171
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IV. ATTEMPTING TO APPLY THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT TEST
The district courts within the Seventh Circuit have had several
opportunities to decide cases involving Rule 12(b)(6) motions in the
aftermath of the Court of Appeals’ decisions discussed above. The
cases discussed below demonstrate how the district courts’ are
applying the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Bell Atlantic.
A. Higgins v. Conopco, Inc.
Michael Higgins, a commercial truck driver, was injured when his
truck shifted while he was trying to secure it to a loading dock at the
defendant’s facility.175 Plaintiff alleged that the mechanism by which
he was supposed to hitch his truck to the dock was old, improperly
maintained and, as a result, did not properly function, thus causing his
injury.176 In his third amended complaint, Higgins brought negligence
claims against Conopco and four other defendants—Unilever,
Unilever Illinois, Seng and Overhead.177 Conopco, Unilever and
Unilever Illinois filed a third-party complaint against Higgins’
employer, England.178
Their complaint alleged that Conopco entered into an agreement
with England that required England to provide Conopco with
transportation services.179 The complaint further alleged that, at the
time of the accident, Higgins was an employee of England, and that, in
accordance with the transportation agreement, England agreed to carry
liability insurance and indemnify Conopco for any harm arising out of
services under that agreement.180 The third-party plaintiffs’ complaint
Cir. 2007); Bartley v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 258 Fed. Appx. 1, 3 (7th Cir. 2007);
Jervis v. Mitcheff, 258 Fed. Appx. 3, 5 (7th Cir. 2007).
175
Higgins v. Conopco, Inc., No. 06 C 7077, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5508 at
*3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2008).
176
Id. at *3-4.
177
Id. at *4.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id. at *5.
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contained a breach of contract claim and a contribution claim against
England.181 England brought a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the thirdparty plaintiffs’ claims.182
In ruling on the motion, the district court set out the standard of
pleading required to survive a Rule12(b)(6) motion in the Seventh
Circuit.183 It said that “[a] plaintiff is required to include allegations in
the complaint that ‘plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to
relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level’ . . . ‘if they do
not, the plaintiff pleads itself out of court.’”184
England argued that the Court should grant its motion to dismiss
the breach of contract claim because the transportation agreement was
not a valid contract; that the agreement never went into effect; and,
alternatively, that if the agreement was valid and went into effect, the
accident was not covered by the agreement.185 As such, the third-party
plaintiffs’ contribution claim should be dismissed as well.186 In
response, the Court stated that the purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
is to contest the validity of the claim, and not to assess whether the
claim is meritorious.187 A complaint need only provide the defendant
with sufficient notice of the claim being brought.188 Applying the
Concentra standard, the court found that the third-party plaintiffs’
allegations concerning England’s breach of the transportation
agreement provided “sufficient detail and are not based upon pure
speculation or legal generalizations.”189 As such, the complaint

181

Id.
Id.
183
Id. at *5-6.
184
Id. at *6 (quoting Concentra, 496 F.3d at 776).
185
Id. at *7.
186
Id. at *17.
187
Id. at *8.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 9.
182
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satisfied Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirements of plausibility and notice.190 The
district court denied England’s motion to dismiss.191
B. Safeco Ins., Co. v. Wheaton Bank and Trust, Co.
In Safeco, the plaintiff, Safeco Insurance (“Safeco”), sued
Wheaton Bank and Trust (“Wheaton”) for conversion, improper use of
trust funds, and constructive trust.192 Safeco’s claims against Wheaton
arose out if Safeco’s duties as a surety to Integrated Construction
Technology Corporation (“ICTC”), a construction contractor that had
a deposit account with Wheaton.193 ICTC borrowed over $4 million
from Wheaton, and when a portion of the debt became due, Wheaton
set off over $500,000 from ICTC’s deposits—unbeknownst to ICTC or
Safeco—in order to satisfy the debt.194 Because of these set offs to
ICTC’s account, there were insufficient funds with which to pay its
creditors and suppliers.195 As such, Safeco became obligated as a
surety to provide the funds for ICTC while the account was short.196
Safeco contended that the set offs were improper and, as a result of the
set offs, it had to pay more than $1.6 million in order to satisfy ICTC’s
debts to its subcontractors.197 Wheaton made a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss Safeco’s complaint for failure to state a claim.198
The court said that in order for a plaintiff to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, “[he] must plead sufficient facts to give
fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests, and those,
190

Id. (citing Airborne, 499 F.3d.at 667).
Id. at *18 (finding that because it was too early in the proceedings to assess
the validity of the transportation agreement, England’s motion to dismiss the
contribution claim had to be denied).
192
Safeco Ins. Co. v. Wheaton Bank and Trust, No. 07 C 2397, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5513, 1-2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2008).
193
Id. at *1.
194
Id.
195
Id. at *4.
196
Id.
197
Id. at *1.
198
Id. at *5-6.
191
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if true, must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief,
‘raising that right to relief above the speculative level.’”199
Regarding the conversion claim, Wheaton argued that Safeco’s
complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because it failed to
adequately allege that Safeco had a right to the money it demanded;
that its right was present and unconditional; and that the defendant
wrongfully refused to return the money. 200 The court agreed.201
Safeco claimed that as subrogee of the subcontractors it had a
present and unconditional right to the money set off by Wheaton.202
However, under Illinois law a bank takes title to the money deposited
with it and subsequently becomes a debtor to the creditor depositor.203
As such, when a trustee—such as ICTC—deposits trust funds into a
bank account, only the trustee, and not the beneficiary—in this case
Safeco, as subrogee of the subcontractors—has an immediate and
unconditional right to possess the amount deposited.204 The
beneficiaries of the trust may seek to recover their funds from the
trustee, but they cannot recover their funds from the bank under a
theory of conversion.205 The court reasoned that because of this
principle, Safeco could not sue Wheaton for conversion based on the
subcontractors’ equitable interest in the deposits.206
The court also found that the conversion claim was deficient
because Safeco did not allege that the bank knew, or should have
known, that the set offs included trust funds.207 While a bank has a
right to set off the accounts of its customers in order to satisfy their
indebtedness, this right does not extend to situations in which the bank
has notice, whether actual or constructive, that the accounts include
199

Id. at *5 (quoting in part Concentra, 496 F.3d at 776).
Id. at *6.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id. at *7.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id. at *8-9.
207
Id. at *9.
200
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trust funds.208 Because the “[c]omplaint does not contain sufficient
allegations to plausibly suggest that the bank knew or should have
know that it was setting off trust assets[,]” the court dismissed the
conversion claim without prejudice.209 In so doing it stated that Safeco
may be able to correct the defects by amending the complaint to allege
that Wheaton had knowledge that the set offs contained trust assets,
and by pleading claims subrogated from ICTC, rather than from its
subcontractors.210
The court dismissed the mechanics lien claim, holding that the act
does not create a right of action against a bank that sets off funds held
by a contractor in trust for a subcontractor, and it dismissed the
constructive trust claim for failure to allege knowledge on the part of
Wheaton.211 Because Safeco’s complaint lacked plausibility, the court
did not reach the question of notice.
C. Zamudio v. HSBC N.Am. Holdings, Inc.
In 2005, plaintiff Robert Zamudio, a 55 year-old MexicanAmerican, attempted to refinance the mortgage on his home at
Beneficial, a subsidiary mortgage company of the defendant,
HSBC.212 Zamudio alleged that a Beneficial loan officer told the him
that if his home was appraised at more than $140,000 he would be able
to refinance.213 Plaintiff’s home was subsequently appraised at
$144,900, but his loan application was denied.214 When plaintiff
contacted the loan office to ask why his application had been denied
he was informed that the value of his home was insufficient.215
208

Id.
Id. at *9, 14.
210
Id. at *14.
211
Id. at *15, 17-18.
212
Zamudio v. HSBC N.Am. Holdings, Inc., No. 07 C 4315, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13952 at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2008).
213
Id. at *2.
214
Id.
215
Id.
209
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Plaintiff alleged that this was not the real reason his loan was denied,
but rather, the denial was a result of HSBC’s automated underwriting
and credit scoring systems, which have a discriminatory impact on
minority applicants, such as the plaintiff.216 He filed suit against
HSBC alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”)217 and the
Equal Opportunity Credit Act (“ECOA”).218 The defendant made a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims.
The district court said that in order to satisfy the requirements of
Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must accomplish two things:
“[T]he complaint must describe the claim in sufficient detail
to give the defendant ‘fair notice of what . . . the claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests . . . .’219 Second, its
allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a
right to relief, raising that possibility above a ‘speculative
level’; if they do not, the plaintiff pleads itself out of
court.”220
HSBC argued that because Zamudio failed to specifically identify
any discriminatory policy or practice, that he failed to provide the
defendants with fair notice of the claims against them.221 However, the
court ruled that Zamudio’s assertion that “racially discriminatory
assumptions are embedded in the statistical formulas used [by the
defendants] to analyze credit information and ultimately form
underwriting decisions” is sufficient to meet the pleading requirements
imposed by Bell Atlantic.222 Furthermore, the complaint plausibly
suggested a right to relief because the FHA and ECOA both make
216

Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3609 (2000).
218
15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2000).
219
Zamudio, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13952 at *3 (quoting Bell Atlantic, 127 S.
Ct. at 1964 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47).
220
Id. (quoting Concentra, 496 F.3d at 779).
221
Id. at *4.
222
Id.
217

523
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008

33

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 2

Spring 2008

available to plaintiffs a claim for disparate-impact claim.223 The court
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.224
D. CardioNet, Inc. v. LifeWatch, Corp.
LifeWatch and CardioNet are competitors that make heart
monitoring devices.225 In January of 2007, LifeWatch launched a
product called the LifeStar Ambulatory Cardiac Telemetry (“LifeStar
ACT”), which was the subject of the litigation.226 Counter-plaintiff,
LifeWatch, filed suit against CardioNet for a series statements made
and actions taken by CardioNet with respect to the LifeStar ACT.227
LifeWatch’s complaint alleged trade secret misappropriation,228
intentional interference with expectation of business relationships,
unfair competition, and three counts of fraud.229 The district court
dismissed the fraud claims for failure to state a claim under Rule
9(b),230 but denied the CardioNet’s motion to dismiss with respect to
the other claims.231
The district court began its analysis by setting forth the applicable
federal pleading standard.232 In order to avoid dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6), “LifeWatch need only provide enough detail [in the
complaint] to give CardioNet fair notice of its claims, show that the
223

Id.
Id. at *6.
225
CardioNet v. LifeWatch, No. 07 C 6625, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15941 at
*3 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
226
Id.
227
Id. at *3-5.
228
CardioNet’s motion to dismiss do not challenge LifeWatch’s trade
misappropriation claim. As such, the court did not assess the sufficiency of
LifeWatch’s complaint with respect to that claim.
229
Id. at *1-2.
230
Fraud is one of the claims that must be pleaded with heightened specificity
under Rule 9(b). A discussion of the court’s ruling with respect to the fraud claims
contained in LifeWatch’s complaint is outside the scope of this Note.
231
CardioNet, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15941 at *12.
232
Id. at *2.
224

524
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss2/3

34

Saltzman: Ding, Dong, Conley ’s Dead: Bell Atlantic Changes the Federal Ple

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 2

Spring 2008

claims are plausible, rather than merely speculative, and that relief is
warranted.”233 In order to state a claim for tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage, “LifeWatch must allege (1) the
existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy; (2)
knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the
interferer; (3) an intentional and malicious interference inducing or
causing a breach [or] termination of the relationship or expectancy;
[and] (4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship has been
disrupted.”234
LifeWatch’s complaint alleged that in June of 2007, without its
knowledge, a physician improperly arranged to have a LifeStar ACT
system delivered to the CEO of CardioNet.235 While in the CEO’s
possession, CardioNet’s heads of research and product development
dismantled, tampered with, tested and photographed the LifeStar ACT
without informing LifeWatch that it had done so. LifeWatch alleged
that CardioNet used the information it learned to further its marketing
strategy, and that it:
[M]isrepresented in advertisements and statements to
physicians and governmental and private third party insurers
that (1) [CardioNet’s] device was the only FDA approved
and Medicare reimbursed arrhythmia detection and alarm
system; (2) the LifeStar ACT device did not and could not
meet the FDA’s requirements for approval of an arrhythmia
detection and alarm system; and (3) its device was superior
and/or safer than the LifeStar ACT.236
LifeWatch argued that the statements made by CardioNet were
false and misleading because they wrongfully suggested that the

233

Id.
Id. at *9.
235
Id.
236
Id. at *4.
234
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LifeStar ACT was less safe and reliable than CardioNet’s device, and
because the LifeStar ACT was and is FDA approved.237
The court held that LifeWatch’s allegations that CardioNet
knowingly issued false and misleading statements to the targeted
consumers of the LifeStar Act device were sufficient to give notice to
CardioNet of the intentional interference claim against it.238 The court
also found LifeWatch sufficiently pleaded its unfair competition claim
because the underlying allegations of a tortious interference claim
sufficiently state a claim for unfair competition.239
E. Analysis
As mentioned before, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell
Atlantic provided very little substantive guidance to lower courts
interpreting the “plausibility standard.” Understandably, it is a difficult
task to provide a bright-line rule to determine to determine the
sufficiency of a complaint without reverting to code pleading, or
imposing fact-pleading on plaintiffs in federal court. It is thus
reasonable to assume that the Court, by expressly disavowing Conley’s
longstanding “no set of facts” language, intended for the circuit courts
to experiment with new (and ostensibly more stringent) formulations
of Rule 8(a)(2).
Although the Seventh Circuit Court of appeals has explicitly
adopted Bell Atlantic’s plausibility standard, it remains unclear, even
after thorough examination of Concentra and Airborne, how a plaintiff
satisfies the plausibility standard without going as far as fact-pleading.
While Airborne makes clear that specific facts are not required to
adequately plead a claim in the Seventh Circuit, it is equally clear that
the pre-Bell Atlantic standard of pleading espoused in Smith and
Kolupa is no longer viable. So what is necessary to satisfy the
plausibility standard and to adequately plead a claim in the Seventh
Circuit?
237

Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *10-11.
239
Id. at *11.
238
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One common thread that ties together the district court cases
described above is that the courts in those cases seem to require either
direct (factual) or inferential allegations touching on all elements of a
cause of action. For example, in Safeco, the court dismissed plaintiff’s
conversion claim because the plaintiff’s complaint did not plausibly
demonstrate that it was entitled to relief. In order to state a conversion
claim, a plaintiff must establish that it (1) has a right to certain
property; (2) that it has a present and unconditional right to immediate
possession of the property; (3) that it made a demand for the return of
the property; and (4) that the defendant wrongfully refused to return
it.240 Plaintiff’s complaint, however, failed to adequately allege that it
had a “present and unconditional right to immediate possession of the
property.”241
In CardioNet, the court denied cross-defendant’s motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, because the factual allegations in
cross-plaintiff’s complaint touched on each element of the causes of
action for intentional interference with expectation of business
relationships and unfair competition.242
Similarly, in Zamudio, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s
disparate-impact claims were denied because plaintiff’s allegations of
discriminatory affect in defendant’s automated underwriting and credit
scoring systems were sufficient to state a disparate-impact claim under
both the FHA and ECOA.243
The Higgins court explicitly stated that, “[u]nder current notice
pleading standard in federal courts a plaintiff need not ‘plead facts
that, if true, establish each element of a cause of action. . . .’” 244 This,
however, is not contrary to the requirement that a plaintiff plead either
direct or inferential allegations in order to state a claim. In Higgins,
240

Safeco Ins. Co. v. Wheaton Bank and Trust, No. 07 C 2397, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5513 at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2008).
241
Id.
242
CardioNet, 2008 U.S. Dist. 15941 at *10-11.
243
Zamudio v. HSBC N.Am. Holdings, Inc., No. 07 C 4315, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13952 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2008).
244
Higgins v. Conopco, Inc., No. 06 C 7077, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5508 at
*6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2008).
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third-party defendant argued that plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim
should be dismissed because plaintiffs failed to allege the
consideration that supported the transportation agreement, as well as
the facts regarding the formation the agreement.245 The court denied
defendant’s motion to dismiss and found that plaintiff’s breach of
contract claim was adequately pleaded.246 Plaintiffs’ complaint
contained a description of the alleged contract, as well as the date on
which it was entered into. This information is detailed enough for a
court to infer that a valid contract was formed. Whether the contract
was supported by adequate consideration, and whether there was a
valid offer and acceptance reach the merits of plaintiffs’ claims and do
not address the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs’ complaint. Providing
factual details concerning these points is outside the requirements of
Rule 8(a)(2).
A Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision handed down April
2, 2008, lends support to the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint
must contain at least inferential allegations respecting each element of
a claim.247 In Glick v. Walker, plaintiff filed suit in the Southern
District of Illinois against several prison officials at the Menard
Correctional Center claiming that they were “deliberately indifferent”
towards his mental health needs and the risks of harm posed to him by
one cellmate’s smoking and another’s threat to kill him.248 The district
court screened his complaint and dismissed it for failure to state a
claim.249 A three judge panel, consisting of Judges Kanne, Rovner, and
Sykes, assessed the Eighth Amendment claims of the plaintiff and
vacated the judgment of the district court, remanding the case for
further proceedings on all claims except plaintiff’s Americans with
Disabilities Act250 claim.251
245

Id. at *10.
Id. at *10-12.
247
Walker v. Glick, No. 07-2929, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 7716 at *1 (7th Cir.
Apr. 2, 2008).
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
246
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The unanimous court held that plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
claim regarding his exposure to second-hand smoke included enough
detail to state a claim.252 Exposure to second-hand smoke can give rise
to two Eighth Amendment claims: one for both present injury and
future injury.253 According to the Court:
To state a claim based on present injury, an inmate must
allege that prison officials knew of and disregarded ‘serious
existing health problems’ caused by the second-hand smoke.
. . . To state a claim based on future injury, an inmate must
allege that prison officials knew of and disregarded exposure
to levels of second-hand smoke that ‘pose an unreasonable
risk of serious damage to his future health.’254
In the instant case, plaintiff alleged that he was diagnosed with
emphysema; that he suffered increased chest pain due to his cellmate’s
smoking; that defendants knew of his condition and his complaints;
and, that defendants did nothing to remedy the situation.255 These
allegations were sufficient to state a claim for both present and future
injury under the Eighth Amendment.256
The court also held that plaintiff’s complaint contained enough
detail to state an Eighth Amendment claim against prison officials that
failed to prevent his cellmate from harming him.257 “To state a claim
for failure to prevent harm, the inmate must allege that prison officials
knew of and disregarded a ‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ and that
harm did occur.”258 Plaintiff alleged that he gave a prison social
251

Walker, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 7716 at *1.
Id. at *7.
253
Id.
254
Id. (quoting Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 1999);
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)).
255
Id. at *7-8.
256
Id. at *8
257
Id.
258
Id. (internal citations omitted).
252

529
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008

39

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 2

Spring 2008

worker two letters describing the threats made against him by his
cellmate and detailing his concerns for his own safety.259 The
complaint further alleged that the social worker told him that she had
passed his letters along to internal affairs; that he never heard from
internal affair; and, that his cellmate beat him badly enough to cause
his head to bleed.260 As such, plaintiff’s complaint satisfied the
serious-harm requirement.261
The court goes on to address the plaintiff’s remaining claims in an
almost identical manner, reversing and remanding plaintiff’s deliberate
indifference and retaliation claims, but affirming dismissal of his
Americans with Disabilities Act claim.262 It is apparent from the
Walker court’s decision that the pleading standard set forth by Judge
Easterbrook in Smith and Kolupa is long gone in the wake of Bell
Atlantic. Whereas in Smith and Kolupa, Judge Easterbrook indicated
that district judges would be reversed for requiring plaintiffs to
provide allegations on specific points, the Walker court’s analysis
promotes exactly what the pre-Bell Atlantic standard prohibited. The
Seventh Circuit’s analysis in the Walker opinion supports the approach
that lower courts should look to see if the factual allegations contained
in the complaint either directly, or inferentially, touch on all the
elements of the claim to be pleaded.
CONCLUSION
The importance of understanding the Seventh Circuit’s federal
pleading standard should be apparent to practitioners. Although the
new standard does not represent a shift to fact-pleading, the Seventh
Circuit courts are clearly requiring attorneys to provide more
information in the complaint. Per Bell Atlantic, the complaint must
plausibly raise the plaintiff’s right to relief above a speculative level,
as well as put the defendant on notice of the claims against him and
259

Id.
Id.
261
Id.
262
Id. at *10-16.
260
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the grounds upon which they rest. In order to ensure satisfaction of
these requirements, plaintiffs’ attorneys should, to the extent possible,
provide factual or inferential allegations respecting all elements of the
claims that they plead. Through the pleadings, a plaintiff should seek
to convince the court that the allegations of the complaint, if taken as
true, entitle the plaintiff to recovery. As Judge Cudahy suggests in
Concentra, a plaintiff should plead all easily provided information that
would serve to notify the defendant of the critical factual allegations
against him.263 Until the Supreme Court weighs in on the matter again,
practitioners in the Seventh Circuit would be wise to follow Judge
Cudahy’s advice.

263

EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 780 (7th Cir. 2007).
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